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Vieira: Vieira: Unequal Educational Expenditures

UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES: SOME
MINORITY VIEWS ON SERRANO V. PRIEST
NoRmAN VIEIRA*
INTRODUCTION

In Serrano v. Priest' the California Supreme Court held that an educational financing system in which the amount of spending in each school
district depends largely upon local property tax revenues, and hence upon
the value of a community's real property, violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court's major premise, sometimes styled the new equal protection, was that unequal state treatment
in areas of "fundamental interest" requires a showing that the inequality
is necessary to some "compelling" state purpose. This premise rejects
the traditional rule which demanded only proof of a rational relationship
to a legitimate purpose. The California court found education to be a
fundamental right and deemed local financing plans unnecessary to any
compelling state objective. Since Serrano arose on demurrer, it was enough
to decide that the complaint stated a cause of action, and the problem
of enforcing an appropriate remedy was not discussed.
Whatever position one takes concerning the Serrano case, al agree
that it ranks among the most significant constitutional rulings of recent
years. Nearly every state in the country has adopted a system of educational finance which shares some of the features held constitutionally
deficient by the California court.2 Moreover, in light of the broad grounds
invoked for the Serrano decision, this case carries major implications not
only for the future of public education but for local government generally
and for the judicial process itself. Because of the overriding importance
of these issues, it is essential that opposing views on the constitutionality
of unequal educational spending be fully explored. The courts, however,
have tended to arrive at unanimous results in these cases, despite the
manifest difficulty of the problem. 3 The purpose of this article is to set
forth some of the views which might have been presented in a minority
opinion, if one had been prepared. The article is couched in the form
of hypothetical dissenting and concurring opinions4 in Serrano v. Priest,
*Professor of Law, University of Idaho School of Law, A.B., Columbia University 1959; J.D., University of Chicago School of Law 1962.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. Hawaii has the only statewide financing system in current operation.
The other 49 states tolerate substantial inter-district variations in spending, produced partly by variations in wealth. A. WIsE, Ricii Scnoors, PooR Scaoors
122-26 (1968).
3. No dissenting opinion has been written in any of the major school
finance cases, though one judge in Serrano cast a dissenting vote.
4. I am indebted to those who have employed and refined this style in
the past. E.g., Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment
in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v.
Henderson: An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 CoLTm. L. Rrv.
459 (1967).
(617)
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but its substance also applies to subsequent decisions in Minnesota 5 and
Texas6 which accepted Serrano without dissent.
SERRANO V. PRIEST

ToRy, J., dissenting.
In this case the court holds that a public school financing system
which relies heavily on local property taxes and thereby produces substantial spending disparities among the various school districts violates
the equal protection clause. More generally, the majority rules that disparate spending on matters of "fundamental interest," even though fairly
related to legitimate state concerns, is unconstitutional unless those concerns are "compelling" and the differences in expenditures are "necessary." Because I think these soothing propositions, for all their surface
appeal, are unsound in principle and unwarranted by the case law, I
reluctantly dissent from the majority's well-intentioned effort to remedy
a major problem of educational finance. My opinion will deal first with
the fundamental rights doctrine and then with the efficacy of the court's
rule of fiscal neutrality.
I. The Fundamental Rights Doctrine
In supporting its position, the court places great reliance on its own
"recent decisions [finding that] the United States Supreme Court has
employed a two-level test" of equal protection under which a compelling
justification is required for legislative classifications in all areas of fundamental interest, though a reasonable justification suffices in other areas. 7
But despite speculation suggesting such a broad application for the new
equal protection doctrine, Supreme Court cases have in fact been quite
restrictive.8 To be sure, there are some fields-voting and criminal procedure, for example-in which judicial review has approximated this
court's test. But to recognize this is not to suggest that every interest which
a court deems "fundamental" should occasion heavy-handed judicial
intervention. The Supreme Court decisions invoking the compelling justifi5. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
6. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972).
7. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
8. I put to one side the decisions governing racial discrimination. Those
decisions, while subjecting racially based action to dose scrutiny, do not turn
on whether the area of discrimination is fundamental or trivial. See Vieira, Racial
Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MicI. L.
REV. 1553 (1969). In the case before us the fundamental rights doctrine is indispensable, since the type of classification involved here is common to nearly
all municipal and county services and could not by itself require a compelling
justification. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 339-446 (1970); Michelman, Foreword: On Protectingthe Poor Through

the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 22-23 (1969). In view of the
ultimate reliance on the fundamental rights theory, it is unnecessary for me to
give separate treatment to the court's identification of wealth as a suspect classification.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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cation test are not only confined to a few narrowly circumscribed areas
of governmental action but have served such limited functions, as we
shall see, that even if carried to their logical conclusion, the cases would
not control the dispute before us.
One function of the new equal protection has been to safeguard
the substantive freedoms embodied in the Federal Constitution. This was
the implicit burden of Shapiro v. Thompson,9 which focused on the
"fundamental right of interstate movement," and it was the explicit
justification for Williams v. Rhodes,'0 which invoked the freedom of
association. In such cases something more than a rational explanation is
properly required for unequal treatment, given the express mandate for
special protection of constitutionally guaranteed liberties." With respect
to unprotected activities on the other hand, the concern of the new equal
protection cases has been, not to review substantive judgments, but to
assure effective access to the decision-making organs of government. It
is this common concern which unites the voting and criminal procedure
cases.1 2 Just as a broadly based franchise is essential to representative
democracy, so access to the courts is necessary to a system of equal justice;
and in order for access to be meaningful, it often must include the right
to appointed counsel and related assistance.' 5 In safeguarding access to
government, courts enforce only a right to be heard and usually upset
no substantive decision of the political branches. Indeed, the legitimacy
of the government's substantive policies is arguably enhanced when persons affected by them have access to the decision-maker. Commentators
have accordingly argued that "several of the common objections to an
enlarged judicial review lose much of their persuasiveness . . . where the
challenge is not to remake substantive policy, but to supervise the procedures through which laws are enforced upon individuals."' 14
9. 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (emphasis added). The casual, or perhaps calculated, use of the term "fundamental" to describe various constitutional rights has
led some writers to assume that the new equal protection applies to all basic
rights rather than to constitutional liberties. However, Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), shows that Shapiro was a travel case and not a case of
fundamental rights simpliciter. See text accompanying notes 34-56 infra. The
freedom of interstate travel has consistently been held constitutionally protected.
See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
10. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
11. Of course the fact that these liberties are to some degree independently
secured does not make this aspect of the new equal protection superfluous. As
Shapiro demonstrates, a restriction on constitutional freedoms which is valid
under both the traditional equal protection test and the specific provisions
safeguarding those freedoms may be unconstitutional under the fundamental
rights doctrine.
12. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963). The same concern is sometimes expressed in cases involving the
processes of civil courts. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript).
14. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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The new equal protection has thus been confined by the Supreme
Court to matters involving constitutionally protected liberties or the
processes of government, and it is susceptible to being limited to those
fields. Since the problem of school finance is far removed from both of
those areas,1 5 a major extension of doctrine is required to reach this case.
But if the new equal protection is extended to appropriations for
education, it will be wholly indistinguishable from the discredited regime
of Lochner v. New York. 1 6 Under that regime, courts freely substituted
their judgment for that of the legislative branches on a variety of subjects
not set forth in the Constitution but deemed important to the liberalism
of the times. "Rates set by public-utility commissions were disallowed
as confiscatory. Statutes regulating working conditions were held to impair
'liberty of contract.' Taxes were invalidated."' 7 The results were not
uniformly destructive of regulatory power, "but this only emphasized the
fact that the Court, and not the legislature, became the final judge of
what might be law.... ."Is W¥omen's working hours could be regulated,' 9
but not their rates of pay.2 0 Men, on the other hand, had a constitutional
right to work more than 10 hours per day in a bakery, 21 though they could
be barred from working more than 8 in a coal mine. 22 Prices might or
might not be regulated, depending on whether courts believed the matter
was "affected with a public interest." This meant that the rates charged
by stockyards, 23 fire insurance companies, 24 and tobacco warehouses 25
27
could be controlled, but gasoline prices2 6 and employment agency fees
were constitutionally immune to regulation. In the field of labor-management relations the government had no power to protect employees against
being discharged for joining a union 2 s and no power to refuse to protect
employers against being picketed or boycotted by employees.2 9 Although
most of these cases fell under the spell of substantive due process, they
could as easily have been brought within the broad reach of the equal
protection clause, since the statutes under review restricted some activities
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 358 (1957). See also Mendelson, Mr. justice
Frankfurterand the Process of JudicialReview, 103 U. PA. L. R.v. 295, 308 (1954).
15. See note 41 infra.
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Currie, The Three-judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation,
32 U. CI. L. R.v. 1, 5 (1964).
18. R.

JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL Sup

mAcy 70 (1941).

19. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
20. Adkins v. Childrens' Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
23. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
24. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
25. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
26. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
27. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
28. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908).
29. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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and left other similar ones unaffected. The basic fact is that there is no
meaningful difference between an expansive new equal protection and
the old substantive due process.3 0 The resurrection of this brand of
"exacting scrutiny," whether cloaked in the mantle of due process or of
equal protection, would threaten vast areas of state and federal legislation. The majority attempts to avert that problem by limiting the application of the compelling jusification test to rights which judges consider
"fundamental." But this, I shall suggest, is an elusive and unreal limitation unless the latter term is confined-as it has been in the Supreme
Court-to freedoms protected by the Constitution and matters involving
the processes of government. For if substantive policies can be struck down
whenever courts determine without guidance from the constitutional text
that a particular subject is "fundamental," judicial intervention will
surely be as random and capricious as it was under Lochner and its progeny,
which also relied on the supposed fundamental nature of the rights in
question.$1
In considering the feasibility of an unguided judicial inquiry into
the "fundamental" quality of various legal interests, it is instructive to
focus upon the bases for the majority's conclusion that education is a
fundamental interest. The court sets forth five reasons for so finding:
(1) Education preserves a person's opportunity to compete in the market
place; (2) it is universally relevant; (3) it continues over a long period of
life; (4) it molds the personality of youth; and (5) it is compulsory. 32
Since the court does not pause to explain the meaning of the term "fundamental," it is not clear why these five factors entitle education to special
judicial protection. What is clear is that these factors are by no means
peculiar to education. With one exception, all of the arguments are applicable to public health services, for instance. The delivery of decent
health care preserves the opportunity to compete, is universally relevant,
30. For an early application of the "new" equal protection see Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), holding that states could not withdraw injunctive
relief in some civil cases, while leaving it available in others. Truax, like much
of the judicial output of its era, has been substantially repudiated. Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 801 U.S. 468 (1987). See generally W. LocKHART, Y.
KkfAns

and

J. CHOPER,

CASES ON CoNsTrrtMoNAL LAw 461-63 (1970).

31. See, e.g., Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 321, 388 (1921), calling for close
review "when fundamental rights are ... attempted to be taken away... ." This
philosophy was applied during the Lochner era to personal freedoms as well as
to property rights. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 890 (1923). Conversely, the
new equal protection, if not contained by the Bill of Rights, would reach property
as well as personal rights. Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 588 (1972),
acknowledging that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one" and that such a distinction would be almost impossible to apply.
Thus it is not surprising that police and fire protection, street maintenance and

garbage collection have been put forward as fundamental rights. Ratner, Inter-

neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services,

4 HAav. Civ. RiGHTs-Cv. LIB. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1968). For an illustration of how
far this technique might carry us see Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969),
indicating that the freedom to wear long hair is fundamental.
32. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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continues over a longer period of life than formal education, and especially
in its psychological aspects, it molds the personality of the young and of
everyone else in society. Of course, health care is usually not compulsory
in the sense of being mandated by government, though few people believe
they have a realistic option to do without it. But the compulsory nature
of education is quite irrelevant to this case, since I do not understand
the majority to suggest that the repeal of school attendance laws would
in any way alter the requirements of today's decision. 33 If the quality
of medical services in a public hospital-such, for example, as the availability of a kidney machine or other life-preserving devices-may be based
on wealth, I cannot understand why the equal protection clause should be
read to require a different result in education.
The arguments which the majority advances for holding education
to be a fundamental interest also apply in varying degrees to housing
and other necessities of life. Indeed, many educators believe that decent
food and housing are indispensable to a child's success in school. The
necessities of life mold the personality of youth, preserve the opportunity
to compete, are dispensed over a long period of time, and are universally
relevant. Yet the United States Supreme Court has rejected the compelling
justification standard both in the field of public housing and in the field
of aid to families with dependent children. In Dandridge v. Williams34
the Court upheld a ceiling on welfare payments on the ground that it
was rationally related to legitimate state interests in encouraging gainful
employment and maintaining economic parity between welfare families
and the working poor. The fact that the legislative classification discriminated against children in large families and was both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive 5 was ruled to be immaterial in a case dealing with "state

33. Some states do not prescribe school attendance, and those that do prescribe it appear to base their policy not so much on the importance of education
as on the incapacity of children to exercise free choice. Thus, most states draw
their attendance laws in terms of age, which means, for illustration, that a 16 year
old immigrant is under no obligation to go to school even though he is in fact
illiterate. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to
Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 373, 393-94 n.74 (1969). Sometimes health care, too, is made mandatory
for children, again because of their incapacity to choose. See Jehovah's Witnesses
v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967). The compulsory
nature of education therefore provides no adequate basis for distinguishing among
various public services. See note 36 infra. In any event, if our guide is to be the
states' assessment of the role of education, there is no obvious reason why the
government's decision to require school attendance should be given greater weight
than its concomitant judgment that a foundation plan guarantee is sufficient
to meet its educational goals.
34. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
35. The Court conceded that many welfare families had no employable
members and that others would not qualify for the maximum payment. Id. at 486.
Neither the exclusion of the latter group from the state's classification nor the
inclusion of the former could serve the asserted interest in stimulating employment.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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regulation in the social and economic field ....
"36 No reason has been
suggested for finding that the term "social and economic field" does not
include matters of educational finance. Similarly in James v. Valtierra3 7
the Supreme Court sustained a requirement that "low-cost" public housing
be approved by local referendum. Although the wealth classification in
that case was explicit and the subject matter was of high importance, not
only in relation to housing but in relation to the quality of available
education as well, 38 the state was not required to show either that its
classification was necessary or that the justification for it was compelling.
It was enough that a procedure for local approval of low-cost housing
would give people in the community "a voice in a decision which may
lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public
services. .

... ,9

The majority chooses to discuss neither Dandridge nor Valtierra. Yet,
in view of the intimate relationship between home environment and
educational achievement, 40 it is difficult to see why education is a fundamental interest, if decent housing and other basic necessities of life are
not. What is important about the court's oversight, however, is not simply
that Dandridge and Valtierra might control the particular controversy
before us, but that both of those cases provide appropriate testing grounds
for the general proposition that judges may strike down a reasonable
legislative classification whenever they believe that a fundamental interest
is at stake, and that the classification is unnecessary or the justification for
it is not compelling. Because of its failure to confront the problem of
distinguishing between education and housing or social welfare, the court
has missed the central issue which its theory presents: whether judicially
manageable standards exist for determining, without guidance from the
Bill of Rights, which interests are so "fundamental" as to require special
treatment. For me, the lesson which must be drawn from the need to
distinguish between such profoundly important and virtually inseparable
subjects as education and housing or aid to dependent children is that
the fundamental rights doctrine is fundamentally unsound when extended
to substantive matters unprotected by the Bill of Rights. 4 1 Such a doctrine,
36. Id. at 484. It was also immaterial that all jurisdictions provide aid to
families with dependent children and that the practical effect of the state-imposed
duty to care for one's children is to compel the very poor to seek welfare assistance,
much as the mandate for school attendance compels the poor to attend public
schools.
37. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
38. Under current school assignment policies, access to housing generally
determines access to the schools.
39. 402 U.S. at 143. For cases adhering to the Dandridge and Valtierra
principles see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
4 U.S. 78 (1971).
40. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra.
41. The majority implies at one point that special treatment of education

may be justified by the impact of schooling on first amendment rights, though
no suggestion is made that the Constitution confers any right to be educated
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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though intended to implement contemporary ideals, suffers from precisely the same defects as Lochner v. New York, which advanced mainly
the ideas of a few judges; and I see no cause to believe that this judicial
approach will function more appropriately for the indefinite future than
42
it did in the recent past.
II. The Efficacy of Fiscal Neutrality
I have concentrated to this point on questions of institutional competence to which the court is strikingly inattentive. But even assuming
that we are wise enough to avoid the errors of an earlier generation of
judges who gave special protection to fundamental rights, and assuming
also that education is such a right, the course charted by the majority
seems to me quite ill-conceived. First, there is no assurance whatever that
existing disparities in educational expenditures will be corrected by this
decision. It is, in fact, one of the virtues claimed for the principle of fiscal
neutrality that it leaves the government free to adopt any system of educational finance which is not tied to local wealth. For example, some
advocates of the principle propose a "district power equalizing" plan
under which each local community would fix its own tax rate, which
in turn would determine its level of spending for education; poor districts
not generating enough funds for the prescribed level of spending would
in effect be subsidized by districts which raised more money at their tax
rates than they were permitted to spend for education. 43 In short, local
at public expense. 5 Cal. 3d at 608 n.25, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.25, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
618 n.25. But applying the new equal protection to all subjects which affect
constitutionally protected rights would be far different from applying it, as the
Supreme Court has done, to subjects which are themselves constitutionally protected. Almost everything that the government does can be related to the Bill
of Rights: Social security benefits affect the right to travel; labor laws and income
taxes affect the operation of a free press; and public health services affect the
exercise of all constitutional rights. If unprotected activities were brought within
the scope of the new equal protection theory whenever they have an impact
on protected activities, a course which the Supreme Court plainly rejected in
Dandridge and Valtierra, the theory would have no visible limits.
42. In at least one respect the new doctrine would be even more farreaching since, unlike Lochner, it would call for the invalidation of admittedly
reasonable classifications. I can think of no greater threat to the responsible
discharge of legislative duties than for courts to impose on an ill-defined category
of fundamental interests a requirement of compelling justification, which our
experience shows can rarely be satisfied. See Comment, School Desegregation After
Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHi. L. Rrv. 421, 441-42
(1972) ("a state has never succeeded" in satisfying this test). What that requirement would mean in the field of education is fairly apparent. The compelling
justification standard could not be confined to spending disparities but would
extend to inequalities in curriculum, teaching staff, physical plant, special services,
and student assignment plans. The implications for local control of education
and for the state and federal courts, which have not yet succeeded in enforcing
the lesser demands of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
have received little training for the role of educational policymaker, are staggering.
43. The state might provide, for instance, that a tax rate of 10 mills would
result in a per pupil expenditure of $500 and that for every additional 2 mills
another $100 would be added to spending. All districts electing a given tax rate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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communities would control the effort expended on education but would
be insulated against the consequences of differences in local wealth. Plainly
enough, the proposed system would permit a presently disadvantaged
district simply to reduce its tax load while leaving its allegedly inferior
school system untouched. Whatever might be said concerning the majority's
characterization of education, it has never been suggested that the level
44
of local taxation is a matter of fundamental constitutional concern.
More important, there is simply no reason to believe that differences in
local effort will operate less capriciously on educational quality than differences in local wealth. Decisions concerning tax effort for education will
inevitably be affected by the tax burden occasioned by other public services, and since the latter services may be locally financed-at least until
some court is persuaded that they are "fundamentar'-the decision regarding education will depend in considerable part on whether there is enough
local wealth to sustain a high tax rate for the schools. Instead of making
educational spending dependent upon district wealth, we will have made
it dependent upon (1) the extent to which other public needs drain the
resources of the community and (2) the relative value placed by the community on education and low tax rates. Some would applaud this
change, while others would condemn it. But I can find no difference of
constitutional dimension between the present financing system and one
in which a child's schooling depends on his neighbor's appreciation of the
worth of an education and on his community's ability to exert a competitive effort. 45 The choice between these debatable alternatives belongs,
therefore, to the legislative and not to the judicial branch.
The majority implies, however, that if fiscal neutrality does not accomplish the court's objectives it may require "territorial uniformity"
of expenditure in the various school districts.46 Unhappily, the latter
approach would seem to invalidate Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, which provides federal aid "to local educational agencies
serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families,"' 47
a territorial classification that presumably benefits many members of the
plaintiff class. This approach would also require the surrender of local
fiscal control, since otherwise educational expenditures would depend upon
the spending decisions of each school district. But even a policy of strict
would spend exactly the same amount. See J. Coons, W. Clune &cS. Sugarman,

Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CAmIF. L. Rxv. 305, 319-21 (1969).
44. To the extent that the thrust of the court's opinion is to protect tax-

payers, it cannot be confined to school-related interests.

45. Even if an individual could easily move to a neighborhood that shares

his educational values-an assumption which in the case of the disadvantaged may
exaggerate personal mobility-this would not meet the problem posed by the
inability to compete effectively. In order to overcome both problems, one would
have to move into a reasonably prosperous district, and this will be just as difficult under a scheme of fiscal neutrality as under present funding policies.
46. 5 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 487 P.2d at 1260-62, 96 Cal. Rptr. 620-22.
47. 20 U.S.C. § 241a (1970).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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equalization 48 will not eliminate educational inequality. Given the vastly
greater needs of schools in disadvantaged areas, such a policy might perpetuate rather than destroy inequality. Nor will equalization necessarily raise
the most impoverished schools to the current spending level of the most
affluent ones, though that is the dream of many of its advocates. Courts
can require equal spending, but they cannot control the level of expenditure. The states could therefore equalize spending by reducing all schools
to whatever common denominator they saw fit. Finally, even if equalization should lead to greater total expenditures for education, we cannot
know whether the results will be helpful or harmful, since the answer
to that question depends upon the other needs of the community and
upon the prospects for meeting them in the face of the increased costs
of education. Surely it is the political branches of government which must
determine whether schools should receive more funds at the expense of
health care, urban development or penal reform.
Perhaps one reason the majority feels free to gloss over the disturbing
questions of institutional competence in this case is that it underestimates
the difficulty of enforcing a meaningful decree in the face of inadequate
public support for its objectives. Under either a fiscal neutrality or an
equalization approach, I believe courts are likely soon to be faced with
evasive and retaliatory measures, a number of them resistant to judicial
control, in many of the 49 jurisdictions which an interpretation of the equal
protection clause would reach. The simplicity of the fiscal neutrality
formula will almost certainly vanish as soon as the state offers plausible
non-wealth explanations for variations in educational expenditures. For
example, the government might allocate funds in direct proportion to
scores achieved on educational tests. Such a policy would not be based
on wealth and could not be pronounced irrational, but it would favor
largely the same class of children as the present financing system allegedly
does: those whose home environment is relatively rich and conducive to
successful competition in school. Alternatively, local governments may
try to avoid the impact of today's decision through their control over the
assessment of real property. Property taxes are based on assessed rather
than market value, and the relationship between these two values usually
varies with local practice. 49 Consequently, in order for equal tax rates
to yield equal tax burdens, the correlation between market and assessed
values would have to be equalized throughout the state. And ultimately
the United States Supreme Court would have to stand ready to review
property assessments, since otherwise the principle of fiscal neutrality
could be subverted by setting artifically low assessments.
It may also be necessary to contend with retaliatory action by large
48. It is not entirely dear whether the court is suggesting that equalization
is required or only that inequalities in spending cannot be based on geography.
49. See C. DALY, THE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY: SUBURBAN AND URBAN PUBLIC
ScHooLs 98-99 (1968).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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numbers of citizens who do not share this court's enthusiasm for redistributing the costs of educating the young. Affluent taxpayers who wish
to educate their own children without subsidizing the education of other
people's children may simply repair to private schools and then exert
their political influence to reduce funding for public education. Or the
same result could be achieved in part by leaving certain areas of education-foreign languages, let us say-to private consumption and increasing
expenditures in other areas. Under the latter approach the affluent could
maintain a relatively low tax effort, supplemented by some private spending, without altering either the education offered to their children or
the degree of their subsidization of education in other school districts.
Of course, these devices might never be invoked, but that seems unlikely,
and their availability suggests the difficulty we will encounter in achieving
hard results in this field.5 0
Finally, even if today's decision is fully implemented, inequality of
educational opportunity will persist. The majority never really confronts
the question whether a redistribution of funds for education will remedy
this inequality. But the crucial fact, which should discipline our treatment
of the issue before us, is that no persuasive evidence has been found to
connect the quality of education with the magnitude of school expenditures. The Coleman Report, 51 a thorough exploration of the issue prepared
for the Office of Education, concluded that differences in spending have
almost no effect on educational achievement. That report and numerous
other studies have found that the critical determinant of academic performance is the student's own socio-economic background and the most
influential school factor is the social class level of the student body. 52
If this is so, the majority's answer to the problem of educational inequality
is sadly misdirected. After funds are shifted from one geographical area
to another, students in impoverished districts will still receive an unequal
education because of the social class level of their schools. The best available evidence thus cautions against the simplistic assumption that a
reallocation of school funds will substantially affect educational opportunity.5 3 Perhaps when adequate remedies are found for the academic isola50. Some may believe that the unpopularity of property taxes will galvanize
public support for this decision. But in fact the issues of school finance and
property taxation are entirely separable. The court's holding does not in any
way impair the validity of the property tax. Conversely, the property tax burden
can be relieved, as many have already proposed, without accepting the dogma
of constitutionally mandated fiscal neutrality.
51. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (J. Coleman ed. 1966).

52. Id. at 290-325. See also, e.g., Wilson, Residential Segregation of Social

Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys, 24 Am. Soc. REv. 836 (1959). A
reexamination of Doctor Coleman's data has confirmed his findings while at the
same time improving on the methodology of the original report. See F. MOSTELLER
& D. MOYNIHAN, ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 3645, 69-115, 230340 (1972).
53. The court treats this assumption as raising a question of fact to be
proved at trial. As a result, the announced principle requiring that the quality,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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tion of the poor, some genuine progress can be made toward educational
equality; but I am not prepared to return to Lochner v. New York for
the trivial results promised by this case.
We have, then, no reason to assume that today's decision will be
readily enforced, no reason to believe, if it is enforced, that differences
in tax effort will operate less capriciously than differences in wealth, and
no reason to expect that an effective redistribution of school funds would
have a significant impact on educational quality in any event. The court
nevertheless charges ahead, relying on remote analogies to voting and
criminal procedure cases. Yet the majority at no time addresses the closest
analogies to the current state practice of school finance. The most striking analogy, of course, is to disparities in educational spending among
the states. It is well known that the difference between the average per
child expenditure in Alabama and that in New York is as great as the
inter-district differences in most states. 54 But the court does not suggest
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment imposes a duty on
Congress to eliminate differences among the states. Since students in a
highly mobile society will have to compete across as well as within state
lines, it is not clear why the states are under a greater burden than Congress to eliminate spending disparities within their jurisdiction. Nor does
the majority succeed in distinguishing Mclnnis v. Ogilvie55 and Burruss
v. Wilkerson, 6 in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of educational finance suits substantially identical to this one.
In both Mclnnis and Burruss the plaintiffs argued that unequal distribution of wealth in their states caused unequal spending for education, and
the papers before the Supreme Court specifically urged the principle of
fiscal neutrality57 which this court now adopts. The fact, stressed by the
majority, that the Mclinnis and Burruss plaintiffs also made broad claims
not the cost, of education be freed from any dependence on local wealth has no
application as yet. See 5 Cal. 3d at 601 n.16, 487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 613 n.16. Since the outcome of this case is wholly contingent upon the plaintiffs'
luck in proving what most knowledgeable observers agree is not susceptible to
proof-that the level of expenditure determines educational quality-the majority
may well succeed in nothing more than stirring up false hopes.
Some proponents of judicially ordered fiscal neutrality argue that "[iJf money
is inadequate to improve education, the residents of poor districts should at least
have an equal opportunity to be disappointed by its failure." J. COONS, W. CLUNE
& S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 30 (1970). But the right
to be equally disappointed is hardly entitled to constitutional status. Recognizing
this, and noting the data in the Coleman Report, commentators have begun to
propose that increases in public spending be allocated to the improvement of
home and neighborhood environments rather than to the classroom. See F.
MOSTELLER & D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 52, at 168-229. At any rate, the data
suggest no reason for making the standard of judicial review more stringent in
educational finance cases than in social welfare cases. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
54. A. WIsE, RICH ScHOOLs, POOR SCHOOLS 125 (1968).

55. 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
56. 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
57. E.g., Brief for Appellant at 15, Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 .(1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2
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for relief based on "need" is simply irrelevant, for the existence of the
broader claims would not justify dismissal of the suits on the pleadings
unless the narrower claims were likewise rejected.5 8
None of this gives pause to the court, which today is mesmerized
by the inequality of spending among school districts. There is, however,
a simple and constitutionally sufficient explanation for most of those
inequalities. Affluent school districts spend more money for education,
by and large, because their property owners pay more tax dollars. Such
a direct relationship between the amount of money paid in taxes and
the amount expended on public services has never been deemed unconstitutional. Indeed, the telling truth is that even in areas which the Constitution explicitly protects, such as the right to counsel, the fourteenth
amendment has required only some provision for minimum fairness and
has not demanded equal spending or fiscal neutrality. 59 Of course, taxpayers in prosperous school districts do not necessarily pay a high rate of
taxation; often one of the inducements for making large investments in
a community's real property offerings has been the low tax rate resulting
from the regressive nature of the property tax. But it would require a
remarkably dogmatic brand of economics, 60 and a loose sense of history
as well, to read a mandate for progressive taxation into the Federal Con6
stitution. 1
And so, while I fully share the court's concern for the problem of
unequal educational opportunity, I do not believe the way to effective
reform lies in judicial intervention. There is simply no adequate basis
for reading into the fourteenth amendment a rule that expenditures for
education may be based on tax effort but not on taxable wealth, while
expenditures for health care and welfare assistance may be based on wealth,
effort or any other rational consideration. Until we learn far more about
how to improve student performance, we cannot be confident that educational spending will contribute more toward maximizing academic achievement than general funding for other social services. In this state of relative ignorance, we should enlist the fact-finding processes of the legislative
58. The complaint in the present case also advances a "needs" theory, but
the court holds that aspect of the case to be non-justiciable. If this holding is
sound, it is difficult to see how the court can prevent wholesale evasions of its
decree where need is made the asserted basis for educational appropriations.
59. For a discussion of the diverse local practices in providing counsel to the
indigent see

L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE PooR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN

STATE COURTS

(1965).

60. See generally W. BLUM
TAXATiON (1953).

& H.

KALvEN,

THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE

61. The founders provided in article I, section 9, that "[n]o capitation, or
other direct Tax, shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census. . . ." This
provision was interpreted long after the adoption of the fifth and fourteenth

amendments to require that federal taxes on income from real property be
apportioned according to population. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429 (1895). It was only in 1913 that this constitutional mandate for
highly regressive taxation was modified by the sixteenth amendment and Congress
was given a free hand to establish a progressive tax on property.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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branches, rather than dismiss those processes by constitutionalizing the
matters before us.
WHiG,

J., concurring.

I agree with Judge Tory that the new equal protection cases upon
which the majority relies62 are properly confined to freedoms protected
by the Constitution and matters involving access to government. I would,
however, add a few qualifying remarks. First, I question whether we can
entirely avoid the type of inquiry which the court undertakes into the
"fundamental" character of particular interests. Even if exacting review
outside the Bill of Rights is restricted to matters of procedure, courts
may have to assess the quality of the underlying substantive right-call
it fundamental or what we will-in order to fix the appropriate level
of procedural protection.6 3 Moreover, the Bill of Rights itself is notoriously
imprecise, and as a result some liberties which are not enumerated at all
have nonetheless been given constitutional shelter. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that freedom of association is protected by the
first amendment, 64 although it finds no mention in the text. And the
right to use contraceptive devices, while not explicitly set forth in the
Constitution, falls under the protective umbrella of the right to privacy,
which is also not specifically guaranteed but has its source in the penumbra
of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments.6 5 There may be a
difference between (1) extrapolating unenumerated liberties "from the
Bill of Rights-a process in which history and the constitutional text exert
a guiding influence-and (2) giving special protection to judicially selected
liberties which have no constitutional roots; but it is a subtle difference.
Finally, there is some suggestion in Tate v. Short,66 which strikes down
the automatic conversion of fines into jail sentences for those unable to
make immediate payment, that the new equal protection standard may
apply to some substantive matters outside the Bill of Rights, although
arguably that decision may implicitly be grounded in the eighth amendment.
Nevertheless, I would not take issue with Judge Tory's view that a
general acceptance of the fundamental rights doctrine would carry us
back to the free-wheeling days of Lochner v. New York; and I could not
62. See notes 9-13 supra.
63. For example, Goldberg v. Kelly, 597 U.S. 254 (1970), held that a state
cannot terminate public assistance benefits to particular recipients without first
affording them an opportunity to be heard, even though less important benefits
could be discontinued without a prior hearing:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss," . . .and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. Id. at 262-63.
64. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
65. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/2

14

1.9'72]

Vieira: Vieira: Unequal Educational Expenditures
UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES

under any circumstances agree to embark again on that course. Instead,
I would hold California's system of educational finance unconstitutional
under the traditional requirement that state-imposed inequalities must
be rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. The state interest advanced in support of the current system is, as the majority notes,
"to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public education." 67 But although there is a logical connection between local spending decisions and local control, no justification whatever has been offered
for the erratic distribution of taxable resources produced by the boundaries
which are now drawn. 68 The present distribution of those resources does
not strengthen local responsibility for public education in either the affluent or the impoverished school district. The former has no real incentive
to exercise responsible control over education, for a wealthy district need
do nothing at all to maintain its current advantage, except perhaps engage
in some exclusionary zoning. And the poor district which seeks to compete
economically has only an incentive to reduce essential non-school services
to unacceptable levels or to tax itself at so high a rate as to discourage
those with taxable resources from entering the community, thereby assuring its continuing disadvantage. In my judgment, a state program which
functions so haphazardly in relation to its objectives cannot survive scrutiny
under a sensible application of the traditional requirement of rationality.

67. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
68. See A. WisE, RICH ScHoolS, PooR ScnooLs 121-33 (1968).
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